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I. INTRODUCTION
Conflicts about the use of ocean and coastal resources typify an increas-
ingly important class of social disputes: They involve multiple interests and
parties, both private and governmental, often with widely distributed con-
stituencies. The stakes frequently include, in addition to significant economic
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This article is one of a number of papers presented to a symposium at the M.I.T.
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dimensions, values not always amenable to financial quantification. The un-
derlying scientific information is at once central and uncertain. And the
shared uses of the resource, both present and proposed, have lifetimes far
longer than those of ordinary commercial arrangements-implicating, there-
fore, repeated interactions among and evolution of the affected interests.
A typical example is the prospective use of the Bay of Fundy's tidal
forces for the creation of electrical power, a project which will create eco-
nomic value for some persons and interests, but which risks perturbing the
economic and social expectations of a wide variety of others. The technology
and its impacts are uncertain. Environmental and biological effects may not
be fully known until years after the project has commenced.
Law provides an important (albeit often insufficient) backdrop for the
resolution of such complex and polycentric conflicts. Litigation has become
a common strategy, and the courts have become a site for framing the
questions that underlie the parties' several needs. Litigation has, however, a
number of serious limitations which may lead the parties to prefer some form
of private alternative dispute resolution process (an "ADR").
The adoption of an ADR technique may alter the role of science within
the conflict management process, but it will seldom diminish its importance.
Indeed, one significant advantage of most forms of ADR is the removal of
the necessary scientific analysis from the distortions inherent in the adver-
sarial legal process. Scientific models and model-building are consequently
tools of significant value to complex-case ADR.
"Model," at least initially, is defined by Psaraftis' definition: an ab-
straction of reality whose purpose is to represent a well-defined real world
process.1 An effective model is capable of providing insight into the workings
of the processes it represents, and of organizing highly complex realities into
workable scales. It thereby aids the parties employing it in propounding and
testing various alternative solutions to the problems confronting them.
The present analysis divides the uses of models within ADRs into three
basic types-Ordained Models, Model Building, and Non-Model ADR. Its
goal is to describe the separate utilities of the three, and to suggest that
choosing correctly among them can, in a given context, promote the achieve-
ment of an optimal resolution of the underlying conflicts. The discussion
will begin with a set of standard criteria for assessing the quality of an
outcome or resolution, and identify the ways in which traditional litigation
falls short. It will then describe two principal domains of conflict manage-
ment-Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) and Preventive Law (PL)-and
will derive from them a set of strategic options which exist for any preferred
outcome. Simultaneously, a new set of "process goals"-criteria drawn from
1. Psaraftis, Assessing Damage and Liability From Oil Spills, in M.I.T.
Symposium 65 (Nyhart ed. 1985).
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the theories of ADR and PL and from the Law-Science domain-will be
proposed, by which the conflict management process itself may be evaluated.
The question in any given case will then be how well the selection of one
model-use variant over the others achieves the desiderata and satisfies the
process criteria.
The ambition of this article is modest-to suggest linkages at a theo-
retical level rather than to "prove" them empirically. A fully rigorous anal-
ysis, employing the three model-use variants strictly as independent variables,
would require the articulation of a comprehensive theory of dispute resolu-
tion, a construction which the state of the literature does not yet allow. To
the extent that the analysis does lead to at least some preliminary hypotheses
about the linkage between process tools and conflict outcomes, it may be
useful to the eventual elaboration of such a theory.
II. DISADVANTAGES OF LITIGATION
Any theory of conflict resolution which aspires to evaluate alternative
strategies must employ, tacitly or otherwise, specific criteria by which the
"quality" of the outcomes or products may be assessed. A list of criteria
suggested by Susskind & McCreary will be adopted for the purposes of this
discussion:
1. The resolution should sufficiently satisfy by its distribution of gains and
losses all of the affected interests to avoid the dispute's reoccurrence in
another form.
2. The solution should capture all of the joint gains available.
3. It should produce definite results and commitments which can be im-
plemented.
4. The process must provide legitimacy to the product.
5. Uncertainty, particularly in the underlying science, should be dealt with
"wisely."
6. Outcomes should be reached efficiently in terms of time and expense.
7. Relationships among the participants should be enhanced for the benefit
of future interactions. 2
Litigation as measured by these desiderata has a mixed but generally poor
ranking. It does achieve definitive results, and, if not commitments, then at
least mandates of unquestioned enforceability. In addition, as Edward Bruce
observes, "Collectively [judicial] decisions constitute a coherent body of law,
which. . . serves as guidance to potential disputants in the future. . . Other,
less formal dispute resolution processes tend to be ad hoc and [do] not
generate principles with the same authority. . . ."
2. Susskind & McCreary, Using Alternate Dispute Resolution Techniques to
Resolve Coastal Zone and OCS Conflicts, in M.I.T. Symposium 19 (Nyhart ed. 1985).
3. Bruce, OCS Lease Sale Litigation: Can it be Avoided?, in M.I.T. Sym-
posium 93 (Nyhart ed. 1985).
19861
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Bruce's observation actually makes two points. First, his word "au-
thority," concerns Susskind and McCreary's "legitimacy" criterion.4 Legit-
imacy in its practical sense means the ability of a resolution to provide those
who fashioned it with a reason why their several constituents should embrace
it? A judicial decree is authoritative; it can be despised but not rejected. It
is in any case involuntary and not the product of the negotiator's own agree-
ment. Negotiated agreements do not have legitimacy, in this sense, exproprio
vigore. But that is not to say that legitimacy must be absent from well
designed ADRs. It comes, in nonjudicial procedures, from perceptions about
the adequacy of the procedures themselves, as well as from the evident good
sense of the resolution.
Bruce's second point, that judicial decisions give guidance to future
disputants, is of less immediate concern in any given dispute, except to the
extent that one of the parties desires an outcome with binding precedential
value for like conflicts with other parties in the future. It does seem correct
that future litigation can be minimized if the applicable law is well developed
and clear. But in order for that feature of litigation to be valuable, the
conflicts must be recurrent in nearly identical forms and not involve large
areas of factual uncertainty. Moreover, the pattern of outcomes in the future
will be optimal in a litigation regime only if the precedential decision was
itself optimal as measured by the remaining criteria on the Susskind and
McCreary list. That is not always likely to be the case.
Although litigation as a conflict resolution process may have certain
limited virtues, it also has a number of serious disabilities particularly re-
garding complex matters in which science is both important and uncertain.
Some of the disadvantages of conventional litigation are attributable to its
procedures. Other disadvantages stem from the way in which questions must
be framed and criteria imposed. Rules of standing and the cognizability of
legal interests limit the flexibility of interests to be joined in the resolution
process, both as to the exclusion of some and the mandatory access allowed
to others. Practical and political considerations in the selection of represen-
tatives yield to formal legal definitions. Similarly, litigation normally requires
that a problem be fully "presentiated ' '6 i.e., that there be a bounded answer
provided in the present for a set of problems that may have both an extended
lifetime and an evolution of interests, facts and parties affected. A lawsuit
4. See Susskind & McCreary, supra note 2.
5. Dauer, Address to the Second Circuit Judicial Conference, reported at
101 F.R.D. 161, 226 (1983).
6. In this context "full presentiation" refers to the process by which the
future relationships and obligations of the parties are embraced within a contem-
poraneous set of agreements which, while established in the present, govern the entire
future of the arrangement. For a full discussion of the presentiation function within
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taken to its conclusion cannot create an institution capable of adaptation to
future developments.
7
A lawsuit must be decided in accordance with the law. Law of necessity
addresses only those portions of a comprehensive problem which can be
stated as legal issues. Two untoward consequences follow: first, the questions
immanent in the problem are altered into forms which the legal system can
address; second, the outcome must be phrased in terms of the questions put.
Thus, both the underlying complexity of the practical conflict is unfaithfully
posed, and the range of solutions available is severely narrowed.
This essential narrowing is the principal reason why litigative solutions
to problems tend to be zero-sum." Positive-sum solutions normally come not
from the choice of directly competing claims, but from the exchange of values
which makes up what other commentators have termed "integrative" solu-
tions. 9 Negotiation rather than adjudication, and the expansion of the range
of available solutions are critical to the maximization of joint gains. Liti-
gation has neither.
7. This describes the general case. There are instances of litigation-some
referred to as "structural reform litigation"-in which through a remedy of injunction
rather than damages a court may make affirmative orders and retain jurisdiction to
oversee a future course of remedial conduct. See generally, Fiss, The Social and
Political Foundations of Adjudication, 6 L. & HuM. BEHAv. 121 (1982). Such cases
are generally restricted to constitutional and certain other public-law domains, and
in the private-law domain to matters of marital dissolution and child custody. In
commercial disputes of the type presently being addressed, continued judicial super-
vision of flexible remedies is nearly always unavailable.
It is also the case that litigation allows for norm articulation by the court as
well as dispute processing, and that this function is arguably a part of the judiciary's
governmental role. See, Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1087-89 (1984).
The argument may be tenable, but it is inapposite: The focus of the present discussion
is on the differential capabilities of litigation and ADR as measured solely by their
satisfaction of the parties' goals.
8. "Zero-sum" and "Positive-sum" are phrases used in game theory analyses
to describe the possibilities of negotiated or individual choice strategies. A zero-sum
game is one in which every part of the advantage gained by one party comes at the
cost of the same amount to the other: What I win you lose. A positive-sum outcome
is one which leaves both parties better off than they were before the process com-
menced: If I have more pizza than I can eat and you have more beer than you can
drink, and if we trade half of mine for half of yours, we will both be better off.
Litigation settlements expressed only in dollar terms tend to be zero-sum: Dollars
received by the plaintiff are equivalent losses to the defendant. For a general dis-
cussion, see J. VON NEUmANN & O. MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC
BEHAVIOR 47 (3d Ed. 1970).
9. An "integrative" solution is one achieved by negotiating parties whose
interests are not narrowly conceived and set against each other in a zero-sum fashion,
see supra note 8, but rather expanded and integrated into a resolution which can
serve both sets of needs. Integrative solutions are nearly always positive-sum. See
generally, H. RArFFA, TmE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 131 (1982) ("Integrative
bargaining converts a single-factor problem into a multiple-factor problem.").
19861
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Finally, litigation does not always employ science "wisely." If a rule of
law is phrased in terms of scientific fact, and if that fact is uncertain, then
a legal outcome selects the most probable factual alternative and predicates
its results on that. There is little room for the wiser use of scientific uncer-
tainty as, for example, through the creation of ongoing science institutions
built into the overall resolution. 0 (Or, as another example, for the movement
away from science as the ultimate determinant and toward other more tract-
able and satisfactory criteria.) Law and science have separate integrities.
"Good" science observes its own. In litigation, the internal integrity of sci-
ence is regularly trumped by that of law.
III. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND PREVENTIVE LAW
Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR) techniques are designed to respond
to the inadequacies of litigation. Their principal aspirations include the
achievement of maximizing solutions through voluntary bargaining, with the
questions posed and alternatives framed not in terms of some extrinsic an-
alytical scheme but from the parties' collective perceptions of the nature of
their interests. "Solution space" is correspondingly enhanced, and the rules
of participation are established by the parties themselves.
The number of available ADR techniques is virtually limitless. Most
common are various forms of mediation and structured negotiation, of which
one recently developed variant is the "Mini-Trial." Private adjudication,
including arbitration, is also within the concept, as are conflict anticipation,
dialoguing, joint problem solving, and joint fact-finding." Flexibility is the
chief common denominator among them. This article will focus on that subset
of techniques which shares the characteristics of employing third-party neu-
trals in a facilitative (i.e. nonadjudicatory) role. 2
The techniques of negotiation, mediation, arbitration and the Mini-Trial
are applicable to those circumstances in which a problem has ripened into a
conflict or dispute. (Hence the phrase alternate dispute resolution.) There is,
however, a second mode of conflict management which addresses not the
10. J. NYHART, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING: AN
EXPLORATORY DISCUSSION 1-21 (1981); J. NYHART & M. CARROW, LAW AND SCIENCE
IN COLLABORATION 255-96 (1983).
11. A number of ADR typologies have been published, among them: E. GREEN,
S. GOLDBERG & F. SANDER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1985); ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH
COSTS OF LITIGATION [hereinafter ALTERNATIVES]: TAYLOR, FINE & MoUcKAD, CPR
WORKING TAXONOMY OF ALTERNATIVE LEGAL PROCESSES, Part I (May 1983 at 9); . . .
Part II-Litigation Management and Planning (August, 1983 at 4); . .. Part III-
Dispute Prevention (November 1983 at 5); . . .Part IV-Court Supervised Alternative
Dispute Resolution (December 1983 at 5).
12. See, e.g., Dauer and Nyhart, "A Loss Allocation Procedure for a Joint
Defense Agreement," December, 1984 ALTERNATIVES at 14.
[Vol. 1986
6
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1986, Iss.  [1986], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1986/iss/4
SCIENTIFIC MODELS
resolution of existing disputes, but the avoidance or anticipation of disputes
in the future, and the architecture of solutions to shared opportunities. This
second mode may be referred to as "Preventive Law."' 3
Preventive Law, or more accurately, preventive lawyering, seeks to an-
ticipate and account for conflicts that may arise in the future. It does so by
arranging transactions and relationships in such a way as to minimize the
probability of conflict, to avoid its disruptive potential, and to secure the
maximum degree of transactional success-achieving those goals through
steps taken in the present.
At its most fundamental level, the mode of problem analysis in preven-
tive law is the reverse of what is employed in adjudicative legal reasoning.
That difference can be illustrated by focussing on four concepts: Facts, Rules
(of law), Results, and Purposes.' 4 In adjudication, the facts are searched for,
and when "found" are taken as givens. The relevant Rules are applied to
the Facts in the form of conditional syllogisms, the conclusion of which is
a Result: "If A took and carried away the property of another [a fact] with
intent to steal [another fact], then A has committed larceny. [The result.]"
In preventive reasoning, by contrast, the first step is the articulation not of
Facts, but of the party's Purpose.
From an elaboration of the several Purposes, the Results necessary to
achieve them can be derived. Then, working "in reverse" with a knowledge
of the available Rules, the Facts which must exist-in order for the Results
and hence the Purposes to exist-can be determined. The balance of the
operation is to cause those Facts to come into existence, typically through
the design of present agreements.
In that process of designing workable forward-looking agreements, three
features should be included, in addition to the substantive terms of the
agreement itself."I The first of these is prediction. It is necessary, for example,
to be able to predict perceptions of injury as they may arise in the future:
Who is likely to experience (and on what occasions) a sense of having been
injured as the arrangement unfolds in planned or unplanned ways? How is
that perception likely to be acted upon? How, then, can the risk of its
occurrence or its disruptive potential be minimized?
The second is the creation, at the outset, of a method of monitoring
performances throughout the life of the arrangement. Doing so establishes
13. See L. BROWN & E. DAUER, "A Synopsis of the Practice and Theory of
Preventive Law" in ABA, THE LAWYER'S HANDBOOK A3 (Rev. ed. 1982).
14. A discussion of these four concepts appears at L. BROWN & E. DAUER,
PLANNING BY LAWYERS: MATERIALS ON A NONADVERSARIAL LEGAL PROCESS 270-78
(1978).
15. The three will also inform, as described infra, text immediately following
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criteria for analyzing future claims of right and helps to minimize the con-
sequences of untoward acts by providing early warning of their existence.
The third is the preservation of bargaining positions into the future.
Any complex exchange which exists through time will have in it opportunities
for adjustment, modification to accommodate new facts and changes in im-
plicit expectations. The workability of the design both in the present and
throughout its life can depend upon the relative bargaining positions which
the original agreement creates (and the parties' satisfaction with them as the
arrangement unfolds). The design must therefore be dynamic and responsive
to the several participants' needs and aspirations. 6
Preventive Law deals with potential conflicts. ADR deals with manifest
conflicts. Complex multi-party problems, such as those of coastal zone and
continental shelf resource use, call upon the techniques of both domains. As
a later section of this article will suggest, there is a method for integrating
them into a single continuum of conflict management. From that integration
an additional set of considerations of use to the selection of "process tools"
will be derived.
IV. A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
A. Introduction to the Variables
The basic framework of the following analysis is that of seeking rela-
tionships among three distinct sets of variables. These are "Process Tools,"
"Process Goals," and "Chronological Strategies." "Process Tools," which
may be thought of as the independent variable, 7 is the first of these sets.
There are three process tools, each being a variation on the uses of models
within a conflict management process: Ordained Models, Model-Building,
and Non-Model ADR.
The second is a set of thirteen "Process Goals"-criteria for assessing
qualitatively how well-designed a given dispute resolution (or avoidance)
procedure may be. Together they describe, in effect, an ideal conflict man-
agement strategy.
The third is a set of four "Chronological Strategies." These are derived
from the integration of ADR and Preventive Law. They are not so much
desiderata as they are descriptions of the resolution options available to the
16. See L. BROWN & E. DAUER, supra note 14, at 485-91.
17. "Independent" and "dependent" variables are, in social science meth-
odology, related as cause is to effect. The dependent variable is the factor one is
trying to predict or explain through manipulation of the independent variable. "[T]he
explanatory variables are referred to as the independent variables." D. BARNEs & J.
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parties in the design of any substantial agreement. Ideal agreements optimize
uniquely the relative proportions of the four.
The burden of the following conceptual framework is to identify the
causal relationships that may be found among these three sets of variables:
in particular, (1) whether, in any given type of conflict, satisfaction of the
thirteen process goals can be enhanced by the "correct" choice of a particular
process tool; and (2) how well or poorly that same choice may lead to the
best combination, in the outcome, of the four chronological strategies.
Before beginning the analysis it is necessary to describe in some detail
each of the three sets of variables. That will be done in the following sections.
Their overall relationship may be summarized in advance with the following
figure:
B. Process Tools: Variations in the Use of Models
The three process tools which make up the independent variable rep-
resent a basic division among the ways in which "models," particularly
scientific models, can be employed within ADR procedures.
The first is the "Ordained Model," a set of statements about causal
relationships, or standards for measuring and determining recognizable in-
jury, accepted by the parties and capable of providing criteria by which future
disputes may be defined and resolved. The model will often not have been
19861
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developed by the parties themselves, but will have been accepted by them at
the outset and can thus be characterized as being neutral. 8
Ordained models have the advantage of offering finality and efficiency
in resolving future disputes. Concomitantly, however, they have the disad-
vantage of fixing, at a moment in time, interests and facts which may not
in reality be fixed. That does not reduce their usefulness in proper cases. It
does, however, suggest that in some circumstances it may be useful to in-
corporate into the existing agreement procedures by which the future may
be accommodated without disrupting the ongoing resolution process.
The second process tool is "Model-Building," a technique by which the
parties or representatives of groups of parties are brought together in the
process of constructing a model. The construction process itself is the focus
of the conflict management strategy. It may be short or ongoing, but in
every case it strives for a consensus about the model to be employed and
thus about the basic facts, assumptions, uncertainties and values at stake in
the underlying problem. The process may eventuate in an accepted model to
handle future disputes, but differs from those ADRs employing an ordained
model by not beginning with the assumption that there is any factually "cor-
rect" set of inputs or relationships. It thus replaces descriptive analysis with
prescriptive argument.
It may be in any given case that the argument-about the data, the
assumptions, or the uncertainties-has already taken place, resulting in sub-
stantial consensus about the model's inputs. Generally, however, this second
process tool is used for producing that consensus. The direct involvement of
the parties highlights some of the advantages provided by its use.
The third process tool may be termed "Non-Model ADR." By this is
meant a form of conflict management which incorporates a subsidiary pro-
cedure (usually facilitated by a neutral third party) that provides the parties
or decision-makers with one or more sets of allocative criteria for use as they
see fit. The process begins by intentionally not determining the nature of the
values to be exchanged. Hence, it eschews the too-early use of a model
representing any one aspect of the underlying reality.
An example of a "non-model" ADR is a recently developed multi-
defendant loss allocation procedure. 9 It adapts the "Mini-Trial" form of
facilitated negotiation to multi-party toxic substance cases in which the at-
tendant science is disputed or uncertain (or both). The process, which includes
the use of an expert science advisor adjunctive to the neutral facilitator, has
been applied in the construction of liability sharing agreements among jointly
liable (or internally cross-liable) defendant corporations.
18. The choice of one ordained model over another can in some circumstances
itself be conflictual. (Indeed, litigation very often turns on precisely that choice.)
When such a conflict becomes intractable, a "model-building" strategy may be nec-
essary.
19. Dauer and Nyhart, supra note 12.
[Vol. 1986
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At selected stages in the process, a neutral (and independently expert)
science advisor consults in confidence with the participants' science staffs,
in an effort to reach the widest possible consensus about what is known,
what is unknown, what is disputed and what can or cannot be further de-
termined within practical boundaries of time and cost. The result is the
advisor's report, which is made available to the principals as their structured
negotiations begin.
In litigation, the relevance of scientific facts is rigidly determined by the
applicable law, even when the uncertainty of those facts is substantial. In
this "non-model" process, relevance can be made a function of uncertainty,
to allow for workable rather than merely probabilistic solutions. As their
needs require, the parties may use, ignore, or override the outputs of oth-
erwise available scientific models, in favor of such criteria as business eco-
nomics, industrial relationships, or internal and external political
considerations.
In sum, the non-model process has these essential features:
1. It removes scientific fact-finding from the distortions of the adversary
process, respecting science's own paradigms and procedures.
2. It does not presume that the answers to questions of scientific caus-
ation will be determinative. As such, it provides science to the decision-
makers as only one of several sets of allocative criteria.
3. It employs, in addition to neutral expertise, the participants' own
scientific staffs-not as witnesses, but as scientists.
To date, the discipline of conflict management has developed compar-
atively little experience with these three process tools. An ordained model
was used in the United Nations' Law of the Sea context. 20 The non-model
procedure has been employed on several occasions in joint defense agreements
for toxic-tort lawsuits. 2' Model-building as an explicit piece of consensus-
building's technical armory has also been used, albeit on a limited scale. 22
Nevertheless, these ideas, and the very concept that process tools are useful
as auxilliaries in a wide spectrum of primary conflict management applica-
tions, seem a worthy subject for fuller examination. Problems 23 arising in the
20. Antrim, Computer Models as an Aid to Negotiation: The Experience in
the Law of the Sea Conference, in M.I.T. Symposium 139 (Nyhart ed. 1985) (de-
scribing the uses of an ordained model during negotiations among 150 nations on
questions concerning the extraction of ocean resources, principally through deep sea
mining).
21. The procedure has been widely distributed among the corporate sector by
the Center for Public Resources in New York City and thus not all of the occasions
of its use are known. For a discussion of one company's (Exxon) experiences, see
Lowenberg, Use of Single Defense Counsel, CPR LEGAL PROGRAM PROCEEDINGS 18
(S. Scott ed. 1985).
22. See generally, C. HOLLING, ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENT ASSESSMENT AND
MANAGEMENT (1978).
23. Examples of such problems are described in the several papers making up
1986l
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continental shelf and coastal zones, again, typify the multi-party and multi-
issue contexts in which their employment may be most illuminating as well
as most useful.
C. Chronological Strategies
From the principles of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Preventive
Law a framework can be derived which summarizes the choices available to
those charged with the management of conflicts and disputes. It should be
clear by this point that what is meant by "conflict management" spans the
full spectrum of both time and process choices. "Time" means the possibility
of preventing, ameliorating, shaping the handling of, and resolving disputes.
"Process choices" means not only the many mechanisms described in the
various typological studies of ADR 24, but more particularly those three proc-
ess tools delineated in the preceding section of this article.
The Chronology of Conflict Management
As has already been noted, it is useful to observe that most of the
complex conflict situations typified by ocean uses span considerable time
during which the parties, their interests, and the technical and scientific
uncertainties are likely to change. The choice of responses to the dynamics
of a dispute can therefore be a critical component of its management.
Conflict resolution strategies may be employed either in cases of present
dispute, or for the purpose of preventing disputes from arising as one or
more of the parties engage in planned activities in the future. ADR and
Preventive Law may therefore be thought of distinctly. There is, however,
a set of connections between them which is useful to the present analysis.
First, most voluntary agreements providing for exchanges of economic values
employ both present conflict and future conflict management techniques.
Most contracts, for example, both define the measures of present exchange
and provide the standards by which executory performances will later be
judged (and, often, resolved).
Because many such situations involve both presently competing claims
of legal right and potentially competing claims on future resources, there is
on the analytical plane a possibility of representing the parties' most basic
conflict management choices on a single continuum. Thus the inner logic of
the 1985 M.I.T. conference. See, e.g., Prout & Tippie, Chesapeake Bay Program
Management: Coordination and Consensus-Building, M.I.T. at 47; Scott, The Role
of Facilitation, Mediation and Negotiation in Initiating Petroleum Exploration in
Georges Bank During Lease Sale No. 42, M.I.T. at 115; and Baker & Knecht, Fundy
Tidal Power, M.I.T. at 121.
24. Works cited supra note 11.
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Preventive Law and that of ADR may be combined to provide a single
framework for a theory of dispute management.
The parties to a present dispute have three basic choices: they may choose
to resolve it; they may choose to establish a procedure by which it may be
resolved in the near term (we shall refer to this as defer); or they-or one
of them-may choose to exit, i.e., to accept the consequences of the prob-
lem's persistence. Many ADR techniques conclude with a blend of the three,
using the choices to modulate the negotiations in a way which achieves the
maximum consensus without breakdown over those parts of the problem that
defy substantive resolution by the procedures then in effect.
Related choices are available with respect to potential or future disputes
(or conflicting interests in an exchange). First, future disagreements may be
fully "presentiated" and resolved by a contemporary agreement. (Hence the
importance of prediction.) Second, they may by agreement be deferred to a
process or institution created by the present agreement. (Thus monitoring
performances and preserving future bargaining positions.) Third, they may
be avoided in the sense that the structure of the initial agreement leaves
minimal possibility of their arising later. (The Purpose-Result-Rule-Fact mode
of analysis.) 25
Ocean conflicts, like other complex polycentric cases, call both sets of
choices into play. There are presently conflicting claims of right as well as
potential future claims and the need for integrative, long-term exchanges.
Conflict resolution strategies sufficient to the task will therefore employ both
the ADR and the Preventive Law continua; hence, the argument that the
three choices in ADR and the three choices in Preventive Law may be com-
bined into a single set of four:
PREVENTIVE LAW / FUTURE DISPUTES
/ A VOID RESOLVE DEFER EXIT
ADR / CURRENT DISPUTES
A comprehensive strategy for the effective management of long-term
problems (or opportunities) will thus attend to the four elements of the
combined present and future domains.
A simplified example can be constructed from the California coastal
conflicts discussed by Knaster, Gianninni and Uchikura.16 Oil industry seismic
25. L. BROWN & E. DAUER, supra note 14.
26. Knaster, Negotiation of OCS Conflicts in the Santa Barbara Lease Area:
The Mediator's Perspective, in M.I.T. Symposium 101; Giannini, Negotiation of OCS
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testing was thought by fishing interests to be in conflict with fish husbandry;
fishing trawl lanes were in conflict with seismic platforms; and, as to the
future, deep water oil exploration and extraction were believed to be creating
risks to the marine ecology. The problem thus contained numerous present
and future opportunities for both profit and conflict.
Certain of the ongoing physical conflicts were avoided by agreement on
changed facts (altered sea lanes). Others were resolved by the establishment
of compensation offices and of ongoing liaisons. Some were deferred by the
creation of a testing program (viz. building a model) for seismic effects on
fish biology. And, although not detailed in the report, it is reasonable to
expect that some residual aspects of the problem were unresolved, i.e. one
or more parties may have exited with respect to them.
Because every negotiated arrangement must address at least some aspects
of both the present and the future, each outcome can display components
of each of the four categories or "chronological strategies." Given the state
of the theoretical literature, it is not yet possible to establish a priori how,
for any given conflict type, the relative contributions of the four should be
adjusted for an optimal mix. All that can be said at this point is that the
process which leads to the agreement should be capable of allowing whatever
combination seems optimal at the time without unintended skewing caused
by the process tools employed. Flexibility and openness in the resolution
procedures may thus be significant factors. Briefly, then, the four chrono-
logical strategies displayed on the combined ADR/PL continuum-avoid,
resolve, defer and exit-comprise one of the two independent dimensions
against which the suitability of process tool selections may be assessed.
D. Process Goals: Criteria for Effective ADR
Process goals represent criteria for measuring qualitatively the structure
of a given conflict management procedure-more particularly for present
purposes, the usefulness in selected contexts of the three process tools (or
model-use variants) just described. (The criteria for evaluating the outcomes
of a negotiation have already been identified.)2 7 These goals are derived from
the related theories of ADR and Preventive Law, and from replicated prin-
ciples of the Law-Science domain. The latter is particularly noteworthy in
the types of conflicts being addressed, because of the importance of affording
to the process the best possible scientific and technical input.
There are thirteen such criteria, which may for convenience be grouped
into three main areas, representing in order: (1) ADR/Preventive Law; (2)
Conflicts; The Commercial Fishermen's Perspective, in M.I.T. Symposium 105; and
Uchikura, Negotiation of OCS Conflicts. The Oil Industry's Perspective, in M.I.T.
Symposium 107 (describing negotiations over fishing rights and oil exploration in the
Santa Barbara channel during the years following the 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill.)
27. SUSSKIND & MCCREARY, supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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issues in "constituency management"; and (3) the experience of science-in-
law.
1. Alternative Dispute Resolution and Preventive Law
a. Value Identification
At the outset of traditional negotiations one or more of the parties may
fix prematurely on goals or positions thought to be important, whereas in
many cases the clarification of more fundamental underlying values or in-
terests may move the parties away from positional bargaining and into in-
terest bargaining. 2 The use of a process tool should help in thus defining
the scope of the dispute in terms of underlying values and real interests.
b. Solution Space
The conflict management process should help the parties to broaden the
solution space, by enlarging the total benefits to be distributed (by helping,
for example, to identify new Pareto-optimal frontiers, or by illuminating
additional interests to trade), or by increasing the perceived fairness of their
distribution. Creative solutions to conflicts are arrived at by the avoidance
of rigid or preconceived remedies and by the parties' recognizing that they
have varied interests which can be traded and, therefore, more effectively
negotiated or compromised. 29
c. Adaptability to New Information
Complex conflicts tend to the dynamic over time. There is a need to
facilitate the introduction, validation, and acceptance of new data into the
conflict management effort as they become available.
28. "Positional bargaining" occurs when one or more of the parties' strategies
is to adopt and defend a position rather than to pursue the underlying interest which
the position is thought tactically to serve. "Interest bargaining" occurs when the
topics of explicit negotiation are the parties' real interests.
As more attention is paid [by the negotiators] to positions, less attention is
devoted to meeting underlying concerns of the parties. Agreement becomes
less likely. Any agreement reached may reflect a mechanical splitting of the
difference between final positions rather than a solution carefully crafted to
meet the legitimate interests of the parties. The result is frequently an agree-
ment less satisfactory to each side than it could have been.
R. FISHER & W. URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING
IN 5 (1984).
29. Sebenius, The Computer as Mediator: Law of the Sea and Beyond, 1 J.
POL'y ANAL. & MGMT. 77-95 (1981).
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d. Maintenance of Bargaining Positions
The model or other process tool should create opportunities for adjust-
ment, further dispute resolution, modifications, and the like throughout the
life of the agreed-to arrangement. It should help to maintain the relative
bargaining positions created by the original agreement into the future, and
be dynamically responsive to the aspirations and perceptions of the several
parties to preserve their reentry into the adjustment process. (The point is
twofold: First, to avoid collateral attacks on the arrangement in the future;
and second, to make the agreement more attractive and therefore more likely
to achieve consensus in the present.)
e. Predicting Injury
An important element of preventive law is the prediction of future per-
ceptions of injury. The present parties should be able to discern who is likely
to feel a sense of injury and of entitlement as the dynamics of the arrange-
ment unfold, so that the solution outlined can be either as impervious or as
responsive as the circumstances may allow.
f. Bindingness
The use of a model should help in creating conditions, formal and
authoritative or otherwise, through which the parties will consider themselves
bound to the commitments they have undertaken (or that have been under-
taken in their names). The ability of voluntarily arrived-at agreements (as
contrasted with the power of the courts in adjudication) to bind the parties
is a crucial aspect of alternate dispute resolution. Frequently, personal par-
ticipation binds the parties psychologically; in other instances, the good sense
of the agreement provides the only glue capable of assuring that the agree-
ment will stick. However, there are other measures, legal and quasi-legal,
that can be employed in private arrangements to augment the sense of "bind-
ingness. '30
g. Monitoring Performances
A process tool's use should aid the parties' (and any third-party facili-
tator's) monitoring of the respective performances and commitments
throughout the life of the arrangement and help in creating criteria for ana-
lyzing future claims of right and for minimizing the consequences of unto-
ward acts by providing early warning of their existence.
30. One such would be to provide incentives for non-departure. In a litigation
settlement agreement, for example, the parties might agree that the ADR process
would be nonbinding but that the neutral advisor's opinion would be admissable into
evidence should one of the parties reject the outcome and proceed to trial.
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Most complex conflicts involve multiple parties. It is therefore charac-
teristic that conflict management agreements are negotiated by representa-
tives. Experience demonstrates that each interest must consider the constituency
management problems both of itself and of the others. How, therefore, can
the representatives of the different constituencies fully and effectively conduct
the negotiations, settlements, and creative arrangements in such a way that
their constituents will be most likely to accept and adhere to the undertakings
to which they would be committed? The next two evaluative criteria deal
with these aspects, which are among the most difficult in multi-party complex
negotiations.
h. Party Flexibility
The process tool selected must enhance the flexibility necessary for the
optimal (pragmatic and occasionally political) inclusion of parties, apart from
the technical rules of interest or "standing." In particular, it should allow
interests identified after the process has begun to be accommodated. The
movement of parties among groups and alignments should be facilitated as
the negotiations proceed.
i. Legitimacy
Those who fashion the process require a rationale as to why their several
constituencies should embrace it and its outcomes. As in the case of bind-
ingness, legitimacy may come from the process' own internal rigor. Or, it
may derive from its prior use or the aegis under which it is conceived and
implemented.
3. The Science and Law Domain
Large and complex conflictive situations such as those arising in the
commercial exploitation of the coastal zone and continental shelf are likely
to be surrounded by uncertainties, many of them economic and political,
but many of them of a scientific or technical nature. Their management or
resolution may take on added difficulty because of the need for gaining
understanding and agreement on facts, on implications of outcomes, and on
the assumptions underlying the technical input. The most informed persons
as to the scientific or technical issues are frequently not the principals-those
empowered to resolve the dispute-but rather their technical and scientific
staffs. Even among the most informed, what is unknown may be so great
as to create substantial uncertainty.
As part of the task of shaping alternative means of resolving scientifi-
cally-laden issues, it makes considerable sense therefore to attempt to improve
the quality of the technical input. Doing so gives a more rational basis for
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arriving at a settlement by providing, among other benefits, a sound basis
on which the negotiators may present their agreement to their respective
constituencies.
One strategy is to create neutral sources of credible scientific input.
Another is to make specific efforts to gain consensus among the parties as
to the technical facts and assumptions in advance of the negotiation or other
resolution process. Still another is to structure the technical aspects of the
process in ways designed to enhance the quality of the science.
There are sound principles to be drawn from experience in the regulatory
.sector, which suggest that it is possible by careful drafting of the process to
improve the quality of its scientific dimensions. The following criteria are
concerned with the quality of the relevant science.
j. Distinction and Allocation of Functions
The uncertainties and dynamics of complex problems tend to transform
scientists into policy makers or facilitators, and sometimes vice versa. Crisp
identification of the respective functions of the scientists, negotiators and
decision-makers tends to correlate those functions with their respective ca-
pabilities and authority. Process tools should help in making those allocations
in a collaborative rather than a competitive manner.
k. Framing the Question
The aim here is to ask scientific rather than policy questions of scien-
tists-"is" rather than "ought" questions-and to minimize (though one
cannot completely remove) the distraction and potential disruptiveness of the
value-laden aspects of technical and scientific work. The use of a process
tool should help frame questions for the scientists and technical persons so
that they can respond in a way consistent with their expertise and function,
and help minimize the value-laden quality of those questions.
1. Room to Breathe for Scientists
The formal judicial process frequently restricts the ability of scientists
and technical experts to provide evidence or apply their expertise in the
manner in which they believe proper and find familiar. Rather than allowing
the law to determine the relevance of disputed scientific facts, as it does in
litigation, the goal should be to allow the pertinent scientific disciplines to
establish their own regime of what is germane. The process tool should
therefore help to insure that the scientific and technical persons have ample
room within the negotiating structure and its subsequent implementation to
deal with the data in a manner that satisfies their sense of the internal integrity
of their disciplines. If so, "better" science is the result.
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The scientific and technical considerations of the underlying issues be-
come a part both of the negotiation process and of the eventual resolution,
whether that outcome is binding or non-binding. They therefore must be
folded into the formal embodiments of the outcome. The scientific input
must be satisfactorily accessible (and readily understandable) to the negoti-
ators, and the science must be "user-friendly." As part of the same goal,
the process tool selected should help achieve effective communication (and,
thereby, understanding and trust) among the several technical disciplines and
among the parties and their facilitators.
V. PRELIMINARY EVALUATION
With the three process tools, thirteen process goals and four chrono-
logical strategies thus elaborated, it is now possible to offer some conceptual,
albeit preliminary, suggestions about the relationships among them. This
inquiry proceeds by considering each of the three process tools in turn and
assessing how well or poorly each serves: (1) to enhance the satisfaction of
the process goals; and (2) as to the four chronological strategies, to allow
the parties to reach an optimal combination of avoidance, deferral, resolution
and exit. The non-model ADR, the least structured of the three, is examined
first.
A. Non-Model ADR
It will be recalled that a non-model ADR is a form of conflict man-
agement incorporating a means of marshalling acceptable data for use by
the parties and the third-party negotiator as they see fit. The process, at least
initially, is not directive as to the allocative criteria to be employed. Assuming
that the problems at issue are complex technically, laden with scientific un-
certainty and contention, one candidate for providing primary allocative cri-
teria is the domain of science. Yet other domains-custom, economics, politics,
law-may offer more commanding (or easier) decision-making criteria.
Translated into the terminology of ADR, the emphasis is on the importance
of identifying the broadest range of interests of the parties, in order to
facilitate the largest solution space.
Thus a non-model ADR process tool eschews a priori selection of any
preferred set of criteria, holding that choice open until well into the bar-
gaining process. It provides virtually unlimited solution space. It also en-
courages the tailoring of the process to the specific needs of the situation
and parties, therefore potentially avoiding costs of superfluous structure.
There is, for example, no commitment to building a model unless and until
its usefulness may be demonstrated. Because of the flexibility of this process
tool, the role of the facilitator is very significant.
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Another advantage of the non-model approach is the high degree of
bindingness that may be expected to arise from the fact that the parties are
a part of the process. Having created the contours of the dialogue themselves,
they can reasonably be expected to adhere to the agreed inputs-and outputs.
At the same time, it anticipates the prospective usefulness of scientific and
technical considerations by providing for a neutral science advisor to the
facilitator, for the latter to use as circumstances suggest. In this manner the
non-model ADR could, if called upon, help significantly in achieving process
goals from the science-law domain.
As to the "four chronologies" in particular, non-model ADRs have,
because of their flexibility, some significant limitations and advantages. Exit
(except from the ADR itself) may be made somewhat more difficult by the
very capaciousness of the resolution potential. By the same reasoning the
ease of resolution is enhanced because of the increased solution space. The
avoidance of future disputes may require the construction of a process to
which conversations about future events may be referred without creating
any perceptions of injury. Such a construction is more likely to be agreed
to if there are no pre-negotiation assumptions that narrow the available
practical domains. Thus, non-model ADR techniques would allow for (though
not necessarily compel) substantial components of dispute avoidance.
Against these virtues must be balanced a limitation on the ability of a
non-model ADR to defer elements of the conflict, which arises from its
refusal to establish criteria in advance. Deferral means an agreement to re-
solve either present or likely prospective issues in the future, and differs from
exit in that some process for that later resolution is agreed to in the present.
That process must be more than a mere agreement to defer. It must be a
procedure which appears at least hopeful as a means of resolving future
questions. It is of course possible for the deferral mechanism to be all "proc-
ess" and no "substance," but in a complex case such a procedure would be
unlikely to achieve wide consensus among the parties. The resolution of
future conflicts (deferral) may therefore require established criteria, whereas
a non-model ADR eschews the articulation of criteria in advance.
In brief, a non-model ADR seems to be a method of choice in circum-
stances where there is factual contentiousness rather than only uncertainty.
Yet, it may be contraindicated in cases with long lifetimes-i.e., for problems
and exchanges with protracted futures and occasions for repeated or evolving
interaction among the parties.
B. An Ordained Model
The use of an ordained model is in many respects the opposite of non-
model ADR. An ordained model reduces solution space but does serve le-
gitimacy and several of the other process goals.
A model is an abstraction of reality. But it is of necessity a representation
of a selection of the total reality of the parties and issues. In a toxic waste
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liability allocation system, for example, there could be a model of the relevant
toxicological or geological science; or an economic model of the corrective
options available; or a political model of the consequences of strategies for
future joint action.
The point is that no model can represent all of the potentially relevant
dimensions of reality. Selecting a model, regardless of the scope and mul-
tidisciplinary ambition it may contain, therefore represents a choice that some
aspects of reality are highly relevant to the discussions, while others are much
less so. A model generates criteria. Choosing what to model is necessarily a
choice of the pertinence of the domain from which the model arises. Thus,
an ordained model should not be expected to widen the solution space or to
identify values in the critical, initial sense. An ordained model does not of
itself provide incentives for the parties to express their own views of reality,
or of what really matters to each of them within the whole range of possible
realities.
However, to the extent the allocative criteria-what counts in the end-
are appropriately identified, and are reflected in the model, then it can be
very useful in assisting the parties to calibrate their negotiations within those
selected parameters. Then the necessity of quantification can force useful
value evaluation. The nearly infinite capability of a well-constructed model
to play "what if" serves as a way to broaden the potential solution space
within the selected sets of criteria. Parties can try a wide range of solutions
in the limited variable areas to see what the effects are. Finally, it should be
noted again that the inherent constraints of an ordained model may serve
well situations with party complexity too vast to allow extended solution
space.
The value of a model to bind the parties may be low if they have not
participated in its development or otherwise do not understand its strengths
and limitations, even though they have by definition "accepted" it for pur-
poses of the resolution process. On the other hand, to the extent that its
representation of reality accords with that of the parties and is responsive
to their issues, the carefully constructed model can provide an analytic ra-
tionale of considerable strength, which may lead the parties to adhere to the
commitments undertaken during the process. The quantitative clarity made
possible by such a model can aid in binding when clarity increases the
likelihood of meeting commitments.
In a similar vein, the appeal of the rationality of the analysis made
possible by an accepted model may legitimize the commitments' claims on
the constituencies represented by the negotiating parties.
An ordained model can be useful in predicting injury, if the injury can
be expressed in the quantifiable terms for which the model can generate
outputs. Similarly, a model can be used for monitoring performance, in a
way that helps to maintain bargaining positions, because it sets at the time
of the agreement the criteria and operating parameters, and thus the outputs
providing baseline expectations against which to observe performances. (The
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model's utility in aiding all of these goals of course depends upon its own
adequacy and quality.)
The ordained model can be very useful in helping achieve the goal of
party flexibility, since any interest can make use of it (in the Law of the Sea
experience many did). a"
The success or failure of an ordained model in achieving the law-science
process goals-allocation of function, responsible framing of the technical
questions, the degree to which the scientific resources are free to operate
within their own milieu, and the accessibility of the science to the decision-
makers-is even more critically determined by the quality of the model and
by factors exogenous to it. It is a vessel, providing the opportunity for
achievement of goals. To the extent the assumptions underlying its algorithms
remain free of hidden values (i.e., they address technical rather than policy
questions, and the technical input into the model itself is the product of
"good science,") they will forward those goals. But a model carries the
danger of obfuscating underlying assumptions, and of overweighing the sci-
entific input if it is given undeserved and uncritical value.
Ordained models may therefore be indicated in circumstances where
bindingness is for other reasons high; where there are extended opportunities
for interaction; and where solution space restrictions may be less important
due to a consensus about the relevance of the portion of reality the model
represents.
As to the optimal combination of the chronological strategies, selective
exit from an ADR employing an ordained model is made more difficult by
the fact that issues to which the model does provide answers are presumed
fairly to be concluded by it. (This effect may be marginal in magnitude.) An
ordained model was particularly well adapted to the Law of the Sea mining
context, for example, where exit was not a desirable option, and where the
resolution of complex questions in the present was necessary to serve the
related issues in which the mining problem was embedded. 2
Avoidance of future disputes is a complex assessment. On the one hand,
the narrowness caused by adopting an ordained model may reduce somewhat
the range available to the parties for the fashioning of agreements concerning
the future. On the other hand, however, to the extent that disputes are
generated by perceptions of unredressed injury, and assuming that such per-
ceptions can be dissuaded by reference to a previously agreed-to ("ordained")
set of evaluative criteria, the likelihood that a sufficiently unresolved dispute
will reoccur may in fact be much reduced. It is therefore difficult to assess
a model's impact on the avoidance strategy. One could conjecture, however,
that the certainty it provides in terms of regulatory "what ifs" is both nec-
essary to and facilitative of such decisions as the capital investment problems
of deep-sea mining.
31. Antrim, supra note 20, at 146.
32. Id. at 142.
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Resolution and deferral should be much advanced by the use of an
ordained model. Deferral should be advanced because the present accepta-
bility of a future process is improved when the uncertainties of its later
application are reduced. An ordained model reduces those uncertainties by
assuring the parties that criteria agreed-to and legitimated in the present will
be those obtaining as questions arise in the.future. Resolution may be en-
hanced, perhaps too much so in a few cases, in that an ordained model may
be too crisply applicable. The "intelligence" of the model itself may be
important in this regard.
C. Model Building
Involving the parties in the task of building a model provides the op-
portunity for focus on consensus-building as contrasted with immediate dis-
pute resolving. It holds promise for achieving those process goals which turn
most directly upon the parties themselves. There is the need in building the
model to be specific, most often in a quantifiable way, about the factual
premises and assumptions that collectively comprise the representation of the
reality at hand. Thus model building offers the prospect of helping to identify
the parties' underlying-and possibly otherwise unarticulated-values. Be-
cause it brings the parties together on a creative task other than (and ra-
tionally antecedent to) the resolving of the specific disputes at hand, it also
6ffers an opportunity to identify widened solution space. Of course, the
opportunity may be missed: The parties may be so tied to prior positions
that they see the modelling process as a vehicle for casting not only their
preferred solutions, but also their positional values in concrete. There is
nothing intrinsic to the process that will guarantee that this does not happen.
Open exchanges of views and a consistent focus on the requisites of agreement
are likely to surface real values and, it may be hoped, eventually widen the
solution space within which they are operating. A skilled third-party neutral
can, in such instances, be helpful in enforcing that focus.
It should also be noted that to the extent that the development of con-
sensus about facts, premises and underlying assumptions has been accom-
plished before model building commences, its value in achieving these process
goals will be less significant.
A further advantage of model building as a resolution tool is that by
participating in the construction of the model, the parties may be expected
to develop a commitment to it, and through it, to the entire conflict man-
agement process to which it is auxilliary. To the extent such a commitment
takes place and is transposed, there occurs a binding of the parties to the
commitments made during the negotiations. The negative side, however, is
that the parties' various constituencies may feel particularly left out and
alienated by not being a part of the model building and therefore less likely
to accord legitimacy to the outcome. A countervailing consideration is that
model building does not predetermine the selection of parties who participate.
Party flexibility is therefore well served. But there is nothing, again, intrinsic
1986]
23
Nyhart and Dauer: Nyhart: Preliminary Analysis of the Uses of Scientific Models in Dispute Prevention
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1986
52 JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
to the process which requires that result. One may in fact speculate that the
opposite can also happen: Those who began building the model might claim
it as their own, shutting others out from ownership.
Three additional process goals-adaptability to new information, the
clear framing of scientific questions to elicit scientific replies, and the de-
velopment of scientific input accessible to the non-technical users-all seem
to be made more easily achievable by making the parties part of the model
building, provided the scientific/technical persons were in fact part of the
process and-again-provided there was skilled third party facilitation.
As to the need for flexibility in arranging the optimal combination of
"chronological strategies," model building is an intermediate option. The
process eventuates in, but does not begin with, an ascertainable set of criteria
for the enhancement of the deferral option. Likewise, the resolution function
is neither over-determined nor deterred by a too-early (or too confining)
statement of what is and what is not substantively relevant.
Similarly, where building the model proceeds apace with the construction
of a future-looking arrangement, each aware of the other, it should be pos-
sible to avoid the "architectural" constraints which the use of an ordained
model risks. Hence the avoidance option is affected neutrally by this selec-
tion-neither interfered with nor promoted.
Finally, as to exit, the flexibility to include or exclude from the model
any aspect of the total reality thought crucial by some party to a part of its
interests is in fact the flexibility to exit with respect to that interest. Exit is
not, however, without its costs in this setting. Because this resolution pro-
cedure does eventuate in some certain model, an interest not wrought in
during the process may not be able to be recognized at any later time.
Model building takes time. It also requires a sufficient probability of
eventual success to justify the attempt. Constituency problems abound. De-
spite its positive utility with respect to the "four chronologies," this process
tool may not be best in every case.
VI. SUMMARY
This brief and preliminary analysis suggests that there are numerous
factors to be considered in the selection of a process tool for a given dispute.
While scientific models may in general be useful in the treatment of such
complex and large scale problems as those typified by the coastal zone and
continental shelf, there is in their judicious use the possibility of maximizing
the various goals which define good process management.
No one of the three process tools, or model-use variants, described in
this paper is capable of simultaneously achieving each of the thirteen delin-
eated process goals, and the four chronological strategies derived from the
fusion of ADR and Preventive Law. It is therefore necessary for process
managers to inquire into a wide range of conflict process dimensions: Is it
time, for example, for broadening solution space (non-model), or for finding
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good solutions within already agreed-to sets of decisional or allocative criteria
(ordained model)? Is there a need to break out of sets which have become
non-productively rigid (using a non-model ADR in the midst of a bogged
down lawsuit)? Is there an important need to bring parties or a limited
number of their representatives together, and to stimulate their identification
with the negotiation process so as ultimately to bind them to it (model
building), or is it more important to provide rigorous support for an outcome
so that it commands the allegiance of diverse sets of the negotiating parties'
constituents (ordained model)? Are the ongoing dynamics of the problem
such that settled reference points will be needed both in monitoring the
outcome and in maintaining a relative standing among the parties in the
future (ordained model), or will it be useful in the future not to be so bound
but to be able to reconvene, or to seek new allocative criteria (continued
model building, non-model)?
Such considerations illustrate (but do not exhaust) the need to examine
carefully the context of each problem in choosing the preferred process tool.
And, of course, these and other tools are not mutually exclusive: Develop-
ment of a model and its implementation may, for example, grow out of an
earlier use of a non-model ADR.
This article offers a taxonomy of process tools and criteria for their use,
and suggests that there are correlations among them useful to parties engaged
in conflict prevention or resolution. The correlations that have been suggested
are, at this stage, almost entirely theoretical, though they have been drawn
both from the authors' own experiences and from those reported by others.3
Additional empirical validation is clearly necessary. As scientific models come
to be more widely employed in future occasions of conflict management,
verification of these theoretical constructions should become a possibility.
33. See works cited supra notes 12, 23.
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